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A Brief History of Post-Lockean Unilateralism: 
Barbeyrac, Carmichael, and Hutcheson on Property
Kiyoshi Shimokawa
Introduction
   There are two distinct lines of thought which we can find in the 
early modern, European discourse on the origin and justification of 
property. One is a conventionalist line. In the seventeenth century, such 
conventionalists as Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf sought the origin of 
property in a preceding compact. Grotius used the Latin term ‘pactum’ for 
this compact. Grotius made it clear in De Jure Belli ac Pacis that a compact 
of some kind, whether express or tacit, is always needed for the emergence 
and justification of property. A compact is necessary because ‘one could 
not possibly guess what others designed to appropriate to themselves’ 
and ‘besides, several might have had a Mind to the same Thing’ (DJBP 
2.2.2.5).1) It is an inter-subjective device whereby people mutually express 
what they have internally in their minds. Hobbes used the term ‘pactum’ 
in De Cive and ‘covenant’ in Leviathan, and developed an indirect version 
of conventionalism to explain the origin of property. According to Hobbes, 
‘propriety [i.e. property]’ arises from the act of a sovereign that has 
been created by a preceding covenant of everyone with everyone else. 
Pufendorf used the terms ‘pactum’ and ‘conventio’ interchangeably in his 
account of the origin of property in De Jure Naturae et Gentium (DJNG 4.4; 
especially 4.4.4-6). A physical seizure of an object, according to Pufendorf, 
1 ) The English translation quoted here is from Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War 
and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck, [trans. John Morrice], book I-book III (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2005). Grotius’s Latin text is found in De Jure Belli ac Pacis in Libri 
Tres [abbreviated as DJBP], vol. 1 Reproduction of the edition of 1646 (repr., 
Buffalo, New York: William S. Hein, 1995).
2is insufficient for the rise of property, and at least one compact, whether 
express or tacit, is necessary for the emergence of property. For the 
compact alone can produce the ‘moral’ effect that accompanies property, 
that is, the ‘obligation on the part of others to refrain from a thing already 
seized by some one else’ (DJNG 4.4.9).2) Rights, including property rights, 
are seen as the kind of moral qualities which are ‘imposed’ or ‘superadded’ 
to natural objects by the convergence of the wills of the intelligent beings 
involved (DJNG 1.1.4). Although Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf offered 
different versions of conventionalism to explain the origin of property, 
they were conventionalists in that they made an inter-subjective compact, 
and hence the consent of others it involves, a necessary condition for the 
emergence and justification of property. 
   Sharply opposed to this is the other line of thought which figured 
prominently in the early modern discourse. It may be called ‘unilateralism’. 
Unilateralists claimed that without the consent of others, an acquisition of 
natural resources under certain favourable circumstances could sufficiently 
explain and justify the rise of property. They rejected conventionalism, 
and dispensed with the consent or approval of others as its normative 
basis. In the seventeenth century, unilateralism was hinted at and 
adopted by some Puritan colonists in America. One of the Puritans who 
took this position was John Winthrop, the leading figure in the founding 
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.3) A clear theoretical formulation of 
unilateralism, however, had to await John Locke. In Chap. V of the Second 
Treatise, Locke famously claimed that each man could legitimately begin 
to acquire a property in external things by his own labour, without the 
2 ) De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo [abbreviated as DJNG], 2 vols, vol. 1 
Reproduction of the edition of 1688, and vol. 2 English translation by C. H. 
Oldfather & W. A. Oldfather (repr., Buffalo, New York: Williams S. Hein, 1995). 
All quotations from Pufendorf in this paragraph are taken from vol. 2.
3 ) For Winthrop’s unilateralism, see his ‘Reasons to be considered for justifying 
the undertakers of the intended plantation in New England and for encouraging 
such whose hearts God shall move to join with them in it’, in Alden T. Vaughan 
(ed.), The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620-1730 (Hanover and London: 
University Press of New England, 1997), pp. 26-33; especially, pp. 26, 28-29. 
A Brief History of Post-Lockean Unilateralism 3
consent of others, in the original God-given world of abundant natural 
resources. As I have explained elsewhere,4) Locke made several theoretical 
adjustments to propose his unilateralist theory as an alternative to the 
older conventionalism of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. First of all, 
Locke appealed to God’s intention to preserve mankind in order to reject 
the claim that a compact or consent is necessary for every legitimate act of 
appropriation. ‘If such a consent as this was necessary, Man had starved, 
notwithstanding the Plenty God had given him’ (TT II.28).5) That would 
be contrary to God’s intention, or ‘his design’ that ‘Man should live and 
abide for some time upon the Face of the Earth’ (TT I.86). Without relying 
on a mutual compact of men, Locke started from the premise that ‘every 
Man has a Property in his own Person’ (TT II.27), and proceeded to show 
how each man could extend and join his prior property to a particular part 
of the external world. In so doing Locke used the famous ‘joining’ and 
‘mixing’ metaphor (ibid.), while also appealing to God’s injunction ‘subdue 
the Earth’ (TT II.32) and evoking the notion that labour, which involves 
pains and efforts, should not be without its reward (TT II.34). Another 
important adjustment concerns the clause that appropriators should avoid 
injuring others. In speaking of ‘enough, and as good’ to be ‘left in common 
for others’ (TT II.27), Locke actually adopted the non-injury clause and 
thought of the situation of abundance which would satisfy it. He also 
stipulated the ‘non-spoilage and productive use’ requirement that one 
could legitimately acquire only ‘[a]s much as one [could] make use of to 
any advantage of life before it spoils’ (TT II.31). Finally, Locke appealed to 
a consequentialist justification of the labour-based, injury-free unilateral 
appropriation of land by arguing that it could increase productivity and 
4 ) For details of what I write in this paragraph about Locke’s theoretical 
adjustments and his relationship to colonialism, see my chapter entitled ‘The 
Origin and Development of Property: Conventionalism, Unilateralism, 
Colonialism’, in Peter Anstey (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in 
the Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
5 ) All quotations from Locke that appear below are taken from Two Treatises of 
Government [abbreviated as TT], 2nd edition, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970).
4bring mankind a number of useful goods and commodities (TT II.40-43). 
Thus his unilateralist justification of property employed diverse strategies. 
However, Locke failed to take the non-injury clause seriously, and allowed 
appropriators to interpret it arbitrarily. As a result, his unilateralism 
functioned as a theory of dispossession for the Native Americans while it 
also served liberal purposes in England. 
   In this paper, I shall continue to offer a narrative of early modern 
unilateralism by tracing its post-Lockean development. First, I shall look 
at Jean Barbeyrac’s account of the origin of property. Secondly, I shall turn 
to Gershom Carmichael’s account. What I intend to do in the first two 
sections below is to present textual evidence to show that both Barbeyrac 
and Carmichael inherited the basic principles of Locke’s unilateralism 
while adding one or two claims of their own. Thirdly and finally, I shall 
discuss Francis Hutcheson’s unilateralism in detail, and show that he had 
a modified version which combined some of Locke’s insights with his own 
functionalist and humanitarian views. The following narrative contains an 
analysis of each version of post-Lockean unilateralism. But it is primarily 
intended to show that there is a significant line of continuity from Locke to 
Hutcheson, which shows a development of diverse unilateralist strategies. 
Unlike Locke’s, the three versions of unilateralism to be discussed are not 
directly relevant to the issue of colonial expansion. But they adopted and 
developed Locke’s original ideas about God, labour, and productivity, 
supplementing them with their own arguments. Consequently, they 
formed a distinct, early modern tradition of thought about unilateral 
appropriation, serving as an alternative to the tradition of conventionalism.
1. Barbeyrac’s Unilateralism
   Barbeyrac endorsed Locke’s account of the origin of property in some 
of the lengthy notes he appended to his French translation (1706) of 
Pufendorf’s De Jure Naturae et Gentium. Let us first see what Pufendorf says 
about the origin of property. In DJNG 4.4.4, Pufendorf claims:
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[T]he Property of things flow’d immediately from the compact of 
Men, whether tacit, or express. For although after the Donation of 
God nothing was wanting but for Men to take possession; yet that 
one Man’s seizing on a thing should be understood to exclude the 
Right of all others to the same thing, could not proceed but from 
mutual Agreement.6) 
Barbeyrac adds a note, and states that there is a significant objection to 
Pufendorf’s view. He says:
No, in no wise. It is certain on the contrary, that the immediate 
Foundation of all particular Right, which any Man has to a thing 
which was before common, is the first Possession. This was the most 
antient way of Acquirement. And indeed, when several things are 
given in general to a number of Men which exist not at the same 
time, and who neither can nor will possess all things in common, and 
such are Men of all Times and Places, the Intention of the Donor 
doubtless is, That those who come first shall gain a personal Right to 
those things that they have gotten, exclusive of the Pretensions of all 
others, without any Consent of theirs needful to be given.  All taking 
possession, according to the Will of the Donor, hath in it an effectual 
Virtue to make the first Occupant appropriate to himself lawfully 
any thing before held in common, provided he takes no more than 
he needs, and leaves enough for others. (DJNG 4.4.4 n. 4.) 7)
Barbeyrac claims here that ‘the first Possession’, i.e., occupation, is both the 
immediate foundation of property and the most ancient way of acquiring 
6 ) Of the Law of Nature and Nations, trans. Basil Kennett (London: Printed for 
Walthoe et al., 1729), p. 365. All quotations from Pufendorf and Barbeyrac that 
appear below are taken from this work. It is an English translation of the 4th 
edition of De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo with Barbeyrac’s extensive 
notes.
7 ) Ibid., p. 365 n. 4.
6it. He also says that this way of attributing property conforms to God’s 
intention, provided an appropriator stays within the limits of his needs 
and leaves enough for others. This set of claims is essentially Lockean, and 
we find in the same note that Barbeyrac goes on to offer a summary of 
Locke’s account of the origin of property. He starts off by saying that 
Locke ‘searched to the Bottom with much Curiosity and Solidity into the 
manner how the Property of Goods is acquired’, and repeats Locke’s point 
that if the consent of all others were required, ‘we might perish a thousand 
times with Hunger in the midst of Plenty’ (ibid.), in spite of God’s intention 
to donate plenty of natural resources for the preservation, use and comfort 
of mankind. Barbeyrac also notes Locke’s point about the practicality of a 
unilateral acquisition of one’s property in the God-given world of common 
things: it is like the case of leaving each child within a family to cut his 
own portion of the meat that his father provided (ibid.; also, TT II.29). 
Barbeyrac then presents Locke’s argument from labour in the following 
way:
Seeing every one is the only Master of his Person and Actions, the 
Labour of his Body and Work of his Hands entirely and solely belong 
to him, as his own proper Goods. So that all that he has derived from 
the state of Nature by his Labour and Industry, what he has gotten 
by his Pains, belongs to him only, and others can’t pretend to them, 
unless there does not remain enough of the same things, or as good, 
among those that are common. (DJNG 4.4.4, note 4.) 8)
In his summary of Locke’s account, Barbeyrac faithfully reproduces his 
view that there is a limit to the acquisition of property through labour. The 
acquisition is limited by ‘the good Usage which may be made of them [sc. 
goods] for the Necessity and Convenience of Life’ (ibid.).9)    
8 ) Ibid.
9 ) Ibid.
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   Pufendorf claims that a compact or agreement is always required for 
the emergence of property, even under the initial circumstances where 
‘things could afford no Service to Men’ unless we were allowed to ‘lay 
hands at least on Fruits and Products of them [sc. those things which lie in 
common]’ (DJNG 4.4.5). 10) Granted that it would be pointless if ‘others 
might lawfully take from us what we had before actually mark’d out for 
our Use’, Pufendorf infers that there must have been ‘the first Agreement’ 
that ‘what any Person seiz’d out of the common store of things, or out of 
the Fruits of them, with design to apply to his private Occasions, none else 
should rob him of’ (ibid.).11) Barbeyrac adds a footnote to this, and states 
that according to the Roman lawyers, it is not necessary to have the original 
agreement to establish property, or the one which prohibits any interference 
with the goods already taken. He refers to relevant parts of Digesta and the 
Institutes, and claims that ‘according to the notion of the Roman lawyers, 
Possession is all that transfers Property by virtue of the Intention of him 
who gives any thing to many in common’ (DJNG 4.4.5 n. 1).12)
   Pufendorf also discusses the view of Velthuysen, the author of De 
Principiis Justi et Decori. It is in this context that he advances the claim 
(which we have seen earlier) that ‘we cannot apprehend how a bare 
corporal Act, such as Seizure is, should be able to prejudice the Right and 
Power of others, unless a Covenant intervene’ (DJNG 4.4.5).13) Barbeyrac 
adds a footnote, and rejects Pufendorf’s claim once again by bringing in 
God’s intention. According to Barbeyrac, a corporal act could legitimately 
result in excluding the right of others because of ‘the Intention of the 
Creator, who has given Men this common Right, that they may make use 
of it’ (4.4.5 n. 7).14) Barbeyrac also appeals to the idea that the equal 
opportunity is available to all. God gave everyone the common right to use 
10) Ibid., p. 366.
11)  Ibid. 
12)  Ibid., p. 366 n. 1.
13)  Ibid., p. 367.
14)  Ibid., p. 367 n. 7.
8an indefinite portion of nature, so that any other human being can equally 
‘plead the privilege of the first Occupant’ (ibid.).15) Hence, no problem 
arises.
   Finally, Pufenforf states in DJNG 4.4.6 that the introduction of property 
needs to be confirmed ‘at least by tacit Compact’.16) In a footnote appended 
to this section, Barbeyrac forcefully claims that ‘there is no need of any 
Renunciation, either express or tacit’, adding that the objections he already 
stated in the preceding notes would ‘suffice to rectify the attentive Reader 
in understanding all that our Author in the following part of this Work 
builds upon that false Principle [i.e. the necessity of a compact]’ (4.4.6 n. 1).17)
   What emerges from all this is that Barbeyrac wholeheartedly endorsed 
Locke’s unilateralist theory of appropriation. Above all, he followed Locke 
in appealing to God’s intention in an attempt to counter the claim of 
conventionalism. We may additionally note that Barbeyrac’s assimilation 
of Locke’s labour theory to the occupation theory, together with his appeal 
to the authority of the Roman lawyers, is very much of his own making, 
and Locke himself does not make a special mention of the Roman law 
notion of occupation or first possession.
2. Carmichael’s Unilateralism
   Let us move on to Gershom Carmichael. He was appointed in 1727 as 
the first Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, and 
he introduced the tradition of natural jurisprudence we find in Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Locke to the universities of Scotland. However, Carmichael 
was critical of Pufendorf’s natural jurisprudence. He wrote and elaborated 
a critical commentary on Pufendorf’s De Officio Hominis et Civis. This 
commentary is known as ‘Supplements and Observations upon Samuel 
Pufendorf’s On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to the Law of Nature, 
composed for the Use of Students in the Universities’. Hutcheson later 
15)  Ibid.
16)  Ibid., p. 367.
17)  Ibid., p. 367 n. 1.
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called Carmichael ‘by far the best commentator’ on Pufendorf’s De Officio, 
and went so far as to suggest that his commentary was ‘of more value than 
the text [of Pufendorf’s work]’.18) It has been translated into English by 
Michael Silverthorne, edited by James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, 
and published along with his other writings.19) What concerns us here is 
the fact that Carmichael agreed with Barbeyrac that Locke’s labour theory 
of the origin of property was superior to Pufendorf’s conventionalist 
account. 
   Carmichael’s criticism of Pufendorf’s account of the origin of 
property is different from Barbeyrac’s in that it stresses a conceptual 
point. Carmichael draws attention to Pufendorf’s view that the original 
community of things is not a ‘positive’ community where things are 
owned by more than one person without division, but a ‘negative’ one 
where ‘things … are publicly available to anybody’ (p. 92). Carmichael holds 
that this view implies that anyone in the negative community may take 
from the common store ‘what he can use for himself and apply them to his 
own purposes, provided only that in so doing he does not prevent the rest 
from enjoying the use of the things that they need’ (ibid.). This implication 
significantly presupposes that ‘the consent of the rest’ is not required for 
the introduction of property. It such a consent were necessary, the ‘negative 
community would be no different from positive community’ (ibid.). This is 
Carmichael’s own conceptual point, which is distinct from what Barbeyrac 
said. Having stated that agreements or compacts are required only if the 
original community is a positive one, Carmichael claims that Pufendorf 
is ‘scarcely consistent, when he denies that the primitive community was 
18) Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Collected Works of 
Francis Hutcheson, vol. IV (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1969), p. i. See also Francis 
Hutcheson, Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria, with A Short Introduction 
to Moral Philosophy, edited and with an Introduction by Luigi Turco [henceforth 
to be abbreviated as T ed.], (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), p. 3.
19) James Moore and Michael Silverthone (eds), Natural Rights on the Threshold of 
the Scottish Enlightenement: The Writings of Gershom Carmichael (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2002). All quotations from Carmichael that appear below are 
taken from this work, and its page numbers are indicated parenthetically.
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positive, while contending that separate ownership of things could not be 
established without agreements’ (p. 93).
   Carmichael goes on to provide a positive account of the origin of 
property, which is basically Lockean and serves to show the superiority of 
Locke’s account to Pufendorf’s. Carmichael first speaks of God’s intention 
of granting the world to mankind for ‘the security and benefit of the whole 
human race’ (pp. 93-94). He notes that ‘most earthly things which are 
useful to man can provide little or no use to several men at the same time’ 
(p. 93). As we recall, Locke stated in the Second Treatise that since natural 
resources had been ‘given for the use of Men’, ‘there must of necessity to 
be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any 
use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man’ (TT II.26). In making this 
statement Locke primarily had the acquisition of food in mind. Carmichael 
similarly stresses that in order for earthly things to be ‘of service to 
men in the use for which they are granted, they need to be specially 
appropriated and adapted to the purposes of the appropriator’ (p. 94). 
This appropriation, he adds, should be protected ‘by a valid right against 
other men’ (ibid.). If they attempt to take away ‘a thing so occupied from 
the occupier’, this would amount to a wrongful act of depriving him of ‘the 
fruit of his labor’ (ibid.). Moreover, if others were allowed to take it away, 
it would be ‘pointless’ for any particular man to appropriate particular 
things for his own purposes in the first place. Indeed, it would be 
‘frustrating’ the purpose for which God originally gave things to mankind, 
i.e. the security and benefit of mankind. So it is essential, says Carmichael, 
that ‘the occupation of such things’ should confer ‘on the occupier’ (ibid.)20) 
a set of property rights, involving the rights of use, exclusion, and transfer. 
Thus he claims that ‘in certain things at least’, the acquisition of property 
‘consists in an act of the acquirer alone, and should not therefore be made 
dependent, as the author [sc. Pufendorf] contends, on a general human 
20) As Moore and Silverthorne have pointed out in one of their editorial footnotes 
(pp. 94-95 n. 3), Carmichael assimilates the labour theory of property to an 
occupation theory.  
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agreement’ (p. 94). 
   There seems to be a gap in Carmichael’s argument here, which he goes 
on to fill. He is making use of the Lockean idea that in order for certain 
things to be useful or beneficial to any particular man at all, they need to 
be appropriated in the first place and be made his exclusive property. But 
this does not have much force unless it is shown what specific things are of 
that nature. So Carmichael considers this question, and discusses the 
specific types of things for which the unilateral mode of acquisition is 
required. He develops and presents his ideas along the lines Locke 
suggested. First, there are ‘things which give man immediate, present use’, 
e.g. food, clothes, and housing. These are the ‘things that we cannot use 
properly unless we appropriate them for our purposes’ (p. 95). Secondly, 
man needs to provide for the future, so the right of acquiring goods 
extends to the ‘things related to a man’s likely purposes in the future’, 
with the proviso that he does not allow any good to perish, or that he does 
not injure others (i.e. ‘frustrate the opportunity for others to acquire goods’ 
(ibid.)). Thirdly, the unilateral mode of acquisition applies not only to the 
moveable things which are ‘directly useful to men in themselves’, but also 
to the moveable and immoveable things which ‘serve human purposes 
with their fruits or services’ (ibid.). Land is obviously included in this 
category. Thus the ‘labor’ which is spent in ‘subduing it, cultivating it, or 
making it better suited to serve human purposes’ is the ground of landed 
property. Fourthly and finally, ‘the further expenditure of labor and 
industry which the interest of human society requires in the way of 
competition’ is likely to produce more goods than we can use personally, 
and we have a property in this surplus. ‘This further fruit of our labor 
should not be taken from us, provided we got it without fraudulent and 
unfair oppression of others [i.e. without injuring others]’ (ibid.). Thus in 
return for the surplus we have unilaterally acquired, we can further 
acquire other useful goods from others by the use of agreements. 
   Carmichael concludes that ‘in all the cases mentioned, private 
ownership of things which have limited use can be acquired solely by 
the expenditure of labor in appropriating them or in preparing them for 
12
use, with the intention of keeping them for oneself; we need not ask or 
await the suffrages of others’ (p. 96). The word ‘suffrages’ here should be 
understood as instances of the consent or approval of others. Carmichael 
may not have succeeded in convincing us why property rights, as distinct 
from the right of use, are really needed for the things he discussed. But it is 
clear that he is indebted to Locke in making human labour the foundation 
of property. Locke’s influence is undeniable though Carmichael tends to 
stress human purposes a little more explicitly than Locke does. Carmichael 
actually acknowledges his indebtedness to Locke when he says, ‘For a 
more thorough discussion of this matter, read the celebrated Locke, Second 
Treatise of Government, chapter 5’ (p. 96).
3. Hutcheson’s Modified Unilateralism: Functionalist and Humanitarian 
Views
   In considering Hutcheson’s account of the origin and justification of 
property, I shall first consider what he says about property in An Inquiry 
into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1st edition, 1725; 2nd 
edition, 1726). I shall later consider A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy 
(1747), which is an English translation of Philosophiae Moralis Institutio 
Compendiaria (1st edition, 1742). Unlike the Inquiry, the Short Introduction or 
its Latin original is primarily a pedagogical work. As a teaching manual 
for students, the Short Introduction seems to lack originality. Nevertheless, 
it contains a far greater amount of exposition on the law of nature, natural 
rights and obligations, and the origins of the family and civil society, than 
the Inquiry. Of course, we should not assume that Hutcheson continued to 
hold, in any of his later works, the same views that he had originally 
expressed in the Inquiry. But we can clarify some of the views expressed in 
it and learn about his additional views, if we make use of the Short 
Introduction and other later works.
3.1 Hutcheson’s Functionalist Unilateralism in the Inquiry
   Before discussing Hutcheson’s account of property, we should take a 
look at his account of the nature of rights in general. In the Inquiry, 
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Hutcheson says that we derive our ideas of rights from our ‘moral sense’, 
and he offers an account of what it is to have a right together with a 
classification of rights. First, he explains what it is to have a right:
Whenever it appears to us, that a Faculty of doing, demanding, or 
possessing any thing, universally allow’d in certain Circumstances, 
would in the whole tend to the general Good, we say that any Person 
in such Circumstances, has a Right to do, possess, or demand that 
Thing. And according as this Tendency to the publick Good is greater 
or less, the Right is greater or less (p. 183).21)
The precise relationship between Hutcheson’s moral sense theory and 
his theory of natural law and rights is too large a subject to be discussed 
here.22) Here we should note that Hutcheson’s explication of the general 
idea of a right in the passage above shows a trace of Grotius’s notion 
of a right as a faculty on the one hand, while on the other, he adds his 
own view that a right do X is the faculty of doing X which, if universally 
allowed, would tend to the general good. Hutcheson’s claim about the 
relationship between the public good and the right seems to suggest that 
the right is an entity whose existence ultimately depends on its tendency 
to the general good. In other words, he seems to be claiming that the right 
ceases to be granted if it no longer exhibits a tendency to the public good. 
If this is really Hutcheson’s claim, then he is offering a kind of utilitarian 
defence which justifies, on the grounds of the public good, the state of 
affairs in which individuals have rights.
   It is not clear, however, whether Hutcheson could defend a cancellation 
21) All quotations from Hutcheson’s Inquiry are from An Inquiry into the Original of 
Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, revised edition, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). Its page numbers are indicated 
parenthetically. This volume is based on the text of the second edition (1726).
22) This subject was taken up, for instance, in Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the 
Theory of Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 4, but I believe 
that it deserves a more careful treatment.
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of perfect rights (such as labour-based property rights) by appealing to the 
public good. For Hutcheson seems to hold that perfect rights are 
constitutive of the public good, which implies that those rights cannot be 
constituted or created by it. Like Grotius and Pufendorf, Hutcheson 
distinguishes ‘perfect’ rights from ‘imperfect’ ones. Perfect rights, he says, 
are absolutely necessary for the public good since ‘the universal Violation 
of them would make human Life intolerable; and it makes those miserable, 
whose Rights are thus violated’, and ‘to fulfil these Rights in every 
Instance, tends to the publick Good, either directly, or by promoting the 
innocent Advantage of a Part’ (p. 183). So the universal use of force to 
protect them ‘seems exceedingly advantageous to the Whole’ (pp. 183-
184). Included among the perfect rights are ‘those to our Lives; to the 
Fruits of our Labours; to demand Performance of Contracts upon valuable 
Considerations, from Men capable of performing them’ and the like 
(p. 184).23) These remarks suggest that the perfect rights including labour-
based property rights are prerequisites of the public good. 
   Perhaps, Hutcheson may still be able to argue that the perfects rights 
could be adjusted or regulated by the ideal of the public good. Indeed, we 
seem to be able to adjust or regulate the degree to which particular holders 
of perfect rights can control their lives, possessions, etc. Or we may be able 
to limit the range of those objects in which people have perfect rights. We 
cannot go into this issue any further, but it is fairly clear that in the Inquiry 
he leaves unsolved the question as to what exact connection holds between 
rights and the public good. As we shall see below, however, Hutcheson 
does show in his account of the foundation of property that one particular 
23) Something should also be said about the status of ‘imperfect rights’ here. They 
are the kind of rights which ‘when universally violated, would not necessarily 
make Men miserable’; the violation of these rights ‘only disappoints Men of the 
Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others’ (Inquiry, p. 
184). To use force for the protection of imperfect rights would ‘occasion greater 
Evil than the Violation of them’; moreover, it would ‘deprive Men of the 
greatest Pleasure in Actions of Kindness, Humanity, Gratitude’. Included 
among the imperfect rights are ‘those which the Poor have to the Charity of the 
Wealthy; which all Men have to Offices of no trouble or expence to the 
Performer; which Benefactors have to returns of Gratitude’ (ibid., p. 184).
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species of perfect rights, i.e. the property rights of individuals, can be 
justified by their contribution to the public good.
   Let us see how Hutcheson explains the foundation of property in the 
Inquiry. He begins by putting forth the Lockean claim that ‘probably nine 
Tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to 
their Labour and Industry’ (p. 187). He introduces this statement in order 
to claim that with a growth of population, the natural product of the earth 
ceases to be ‘sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure’. He 
then advances another claim that ‘a necessity’ arises for ‘the increasing 
system, that such a Tenour of Conduct be observ’d, as shall most 
effectually promote Industry; and that Men abstain from all Actions which 
would have the contrary effect’ (ibid.). Given the necessity to have a system 
which promotes industry, Hutcheson goes on to analyse various motives 
to industry. After observing that ‘general Benevolence alone, is not a 
Motive strong enough to Industry, to bear Labour and Toil, and many 
other Difficultys [sic] which we are averse to from Self-love’ (ibid.), 
Hutcheson argues that we need some stronger motives to industry, such as 
attractions of blood, friendship, gratitude, motives of honour and even of 
external interest. ‘Self-love’, he says, ‘is really as necessary to the Good of 
the Whole, as Benevolence’ (ibid.). Hutcheson’s stress on the role of self-
love seems to have received little attention from commentators on his 
moral philosophy, but he actually justifies the right of property by 
reference to the function of self-love as an intermediary for the good of the 
whole society. If we deprive any person of the fruit of his labour, says 
Hutcheson, it takes away ‘all Motives to Industry from Self-love, or the 
nearer Ties; and leaves us no other Motive than general Benevolence’ 
(p. 188), but as we have seen, the general benevolence is too weak a motive 
for industry and labour. Moreover, taking away the fruit of one’s labour 
‘exposes the Industrious as a constant Prey to the Slothful, and sets Self-
love against Industry’ (ibid.). In short, the labour-based property serves as 
an effective motive to industry, and this is ‘the Ground of our Right of 
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Dominion and Property in the Fruits of our Labours’ (ibid.).24) Thus 
property rights in the fruits of our labours are justified since they stimulate 
self-love and encourage labour and industry, which in turn contribute to 
the good of the whole society. Hutcheson’s account is functionalist or 
utilitarian in the sense that it stresses the effectiveness of a system of 
property for the general increase of industry. This can now be seen as an 
instance of Hutcheson’s attempt to justify one species of perfect rights on 
the grounds of the public good. What he did was to seize upon the 
consequentialist part of Locke’s unilateralism, and he recast it in terms of 
self-love and motives to industry.25)
3.2 Hutcheson’s Mixed Unilateralism in the Short Introduction
   In the Short Introduction, Hutcheson adds some remarks which seem to 
clarify the relationship of rights to the public good, which was left obscure 
in the Inquiry. The ‘primary notion of right’, says Hutcheson, ‘is prior to 
that of a law, nor does it always include a reference to the most extensive 
interest of the whole of mankind’.26) The reason for this is that ‘by our 
natural sense of right and wrong, and our sympathy with others, we 
immediately approve any persons procuring to himself or his friends any 
advantages which are not hurtful to others, without any thought either 
about a law or the general interest of all’.27) Thus Hutcheson proposes a 
bottom-up method of calculating the general interest of all, and links it to 
24) Ibid., pp. 186-187.
25) We should also note that in sharp contrast with this account of the foundation 
of property, Hutcheson has an independent account of the moral evaluation of 
the actions which respect the perfect rights of others. The fulfilling of ‘the 
perfect Rights of others’, hence, of the property rights of others, ‘has little 
Virtue in it’ (ibid., p. 191). For it produces no more positive good than there was 
before.
26) Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Collected Works of 
Francis Hutcheson, vol. IV (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1969), p. 120; T ed., p. 111. 
For T ed., see note 18. The page numbers of this edition will be indicated below, 
along with those of the Georg Olms reprint edition.
27) Ibid.; T ed., pp. 111-112.
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God’s design: ‘the general happiness is the result of the happiness of 
individuals’, and God has ‘for the benefit of each individual, and of 
families, implanted in each one his private appetites and desires, with 
some tender natural affections in these narrower systems’. Consequently, 
actions following from these private desires and affections are ‘naturally 
approved’, ‘unless they should appear hurtful to others, or opposite to 
some nobler affection’.28) On the other hand, however, Hutcheson does not 
forget to add the following:
And yet this we must still maintain, that no private right can hold 
against the general interest of all. For a regard to the most extensive 
advantage of the whole system ought to control and limit all the 
rights of individuals or of particular societies.29)
This insistence on the general interest, however, is vacuous if he genuinely 
defines (as he does) the very notion of the general interest in terms of the 
interest of all individuals. So once again we are left in a state of uncertainty 
as to how to understand Hutcheson’s method of controlling and limiting 
the rights of individuals by the general interest or the public good. But we 
should pass over this general question, and move on to Hutcheson’s 
classification of the rights of individuals and his account of the foundation 
of property. 
   Hutcheson classifies the rights of men ‘according as they immediately 
and principally regard either the benefit of some individual, or that of some 
society or body of people, or of mankind in general as a great community’, 
and divide the rights into three kinds, ‘private, publick, and common to all’.30) 
To discover the ‘private rights’ of individuals, we should first look at ‘their 
senses and natural appetites, recommending and pursuing such things as 
tend to their happiness’, and then turn our views ‘toward the general 
28) Ibid.; T ed., p. 112.
29) Ibid.; T ed., ibid.
30) Ibid. p. 141; T ed., p. 128.
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interests of society, and of all around them’. If we find ‘no obstruction to 
the happiness of others, or to the common good’, then we see that it is ‘the 
right of each individual to do, possess, or demand and obtain from others, 
whatever may tend to his own innocent advantage or pleasure’.31) He goes 
on to classify these private rights into natural and adventitious rights, and 
then divides the private natural rights into perfect and imperfect rights, 
giving specific examples of the two categories of rights.32) 
   The account of the grounds of property Hutcheson offers in the Short 
Introduction highlights the lack of humanity shown in the act of intercepting 
the product of someone’s honest labour, while it occasionally evokes the 
notion of equitableness and justice. ‘Our desire of self-preservation and 
our tender affections’, says Hutcheson, ‘excite us to occupy or acquire 
things necessary or useful for ourselves and those we love’.33) ‘Our sense of 
right and wrong also shews, that it must be inhuman and ill-natured, for 
one who can otherways subsist by his own industry, to take by violence 
from another what he has acquired or improved by his innocent labours’.34) 
Now a general diligence and labour are required for maintaining mankind, 
but ‘no man would employ his labours unless he were assured of having 
the fruits of them at his own disposal’, i.e. unless he had a property in the 
fruits of his labours.35) Hutcheson discusses several methods of acquiring 
property, stating first that the ‘original property’, as distinct from a derived 
one, ‘arises from the first occupation of things formerly common’.36) 
Anyone may first occupy particular portions of the spontaneous fruits of 
the earth ‘either by first discovering them with intention immediately to 
seize them, or by any act or labour of his catching or enclosing them’. That 
first occupant is to be regarded as the legitimate ‘proprietor’ because ‘if 
31) Ibid.; T ed., pp. 128-129.
32) Ibid., pp. 141-145; T ed., pp. 129-132.
33) Ibid., p. 150; T ed., p. 135.
34) Ibid.; T ed., ibid.
35) Ibid.; T ed., p. 136.
36) Ibid., p. 152; T ed., p. 137.
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any other person, capable of subsisting otherways, would wrest from him 
what he had thus acquired, and defeat and disappoint his labours, he 
would plainly act inhumanly, break off all friendly society, and occasion 
perpetual contention’.37) This appeal to the sense of humanity may be seen 
as Hutcheson’s attempt to unpack what is involved in Locke’s ‘joining’ 
and ‘mixing’ metaphor.
   Hutcheson also makes a critical observation on Locke’s account of the 
foundation of property. He says that it is ‘trifling to imagine that property 
is any physical quality or bond between a man and certain goods, and 
thence to dispute that there’s no such force or virtue in first espying, 
touching, striking, or inclosing anything, as to constitute a sacred right of 
property’.38) The real question we should be addressing, in Hutcheson’s 
view, is this: ‘what causes or circumstances shew, that it is human and 
equitable toward individuals, and requisite also to the maintenance of 
amicable society, that a certain person should be allowed the full use and 
disposal of certain goods; and all others excluded from it’.39) Hutcheson 
claims that it is ‘inhuman and unjust, without the most urgent necessity, to 
obstruct the innocent labours others have begun and persist in, or by any 
speedier attempt of ours to intercept their natural profits’.40) He also 
discusses how to settle disputable cases of occupation, where several 
individuals make conflicting claims. According to Hutcheson, we should 
consider ‘reasons of humanity’ and make a decision. But what should 
concern us ‘chiefly’ is that ‘the natural fruits of no man’s honourable or 
innocent labours should be intercepted; or any honest industrious attempts 
defeated’. If this consideration applies to all parties involved, Hutcheson 
adds, the goods in question should probably be regarded as the ‘joint 
property of all’.41) But if this is impossible, then we should follow our laws 
37) Ibid.; T ed., ibid.
38) Ibid., pp. 152-153; T ed., pp. 137-138.
39) Ibid., p. 153; T ed., p. 138.
40) Ibid.; T ed., ibid.
41) Ibid., p. 154; T ed., p. 139.
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or customs and settle disputes for ‘common utility’ and ‘peace’.42)  
   As for the original community of things, Hutcheson affirms the view of 
Pufendorf and Carmichael that ‘all things were left by God to men in that 
community called negative, not positive’,43) and claims that we have no need 
to bring in ‘any old conventions of all men, to explain the introduction of 
property’.44) This clearly shows that Hutcheson is a unilateralist about the 
origin of property. As we have seen above, his positive account about the 
grounds of property in the Short Introduction is a mixed account. It 
primarily stresses the sense of inhumanity involved in taking away the 
fruits of anyone’s honest labour, and it even evokes the sense of inequity 
or injustice. And additionally, it refers to common utility and peace. In the 
Inquiry Hutcheson’s view is predominantly functionalist or utilitarian, 
whereas in the Short Introduction he stresses the sense of humanity first, 
and additionally takes into account common utility and peace. 
   It should be added that this interpretation of the Short Introduction is in 
accord with what Hume said about its Latin original. In his letter to 
Hutcheson, dated 10 January 1743, Hume thanked him for sending a copy 
of Institutio Compendiaria, and made some critical observations. With 
reference to book 2, chap. 6, entitled ‘De Dominii Acquirendi Rationibus’ 
(‘The Methods of Acquiring Property’), Hume remarks that in explaining 
the origin of property, Hutcheson sometimes appealed to ‘private 
Benevolence towards the Possessors of the Goods’, and at other times to 
‘public Benevolence’.45) Hume says, ‘neither of which seem[s] to me 
satisfactory. You know my Opinion on this head’.46) He has in mind that 
Hutcheson already knew Hume’s own conventionalist account of the 
origin of property, one which he presented in A Treatise of Human Nature 
42) Ibid., p. 155; T ed., pp. 139.
43) Ibid., pp. 158-159; T ed., pp. 141-142.
44) Ibid., p. 159; T ed., p. 142.
45) J. Y. T. Greig (ed.), The Letters of David Hume (London: Oxford University Press, 
1932), vol. 1, p. 47.
46) Ibid. 
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3.2.2. Hume clearly took Hutcheson’s claim that it is inhuman to defeat 
and disappoint a man’s labour as an appeal to ‘private Benevolence’, while 
he saw Hutcheson’s references to ‘common utility’ and ‘peace’ as a resort 
to ‘public Benevolence’. Hume treated Hutcheson’s account of property as 
a mixed one, and he was right in doing so.
   Before we leave behind Hutcheson’s unilateralism, a brief mention 
should be made of the fact that it is also found in A System of Moral 
Philosophy (posthumously published in 1755). This work deserves our 
attention here since it sheds further light on what is involved in 
Hutcheson’s notion of humanity, as well as how he combined it with his 
appeal to common utility or the public good. Despite its posthumous 
publication, the work seems to have been written earlier than the Institutio 
Compendiaria. According to William Robert Scott, Hutcheson’s letters 
suggest that its manuscript was nearly finished by September 1737, or 
February 1738.47) For our purpose, it is sufficient to note the main points 
that he presented in the System. First, a right arises not only when a human 
action tends to the good of society, but when it tends to ‘the interest of the 
individual consistently with the rights of others and the general good of 
society’.48) Secondly, the origin of property should not be sought in any 
preceding compact of the kind which Grotius or Pufendorf proposed.49) 
Thirdly and finally, property rights are grounded on two foundations, i.e. 
‘the right of the first occupant’ and ‘labour’. The right of the first occupant 
is based on the sense of humanity (which we have discussed above), while 
the ‘labour’ is linked further to ‘both the immediate feelings of our hearts, 
and the consideration of the general interest’.50)  
   Hutcheson further describes the ‘immediate feelings of our hearts’. 
47) William Robert Scott, Francis Hutcheson: His Life, Teaching and Position in the 
History of Philosophy (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966; first published in 
1900), p. 113.
48) A System of Moral Philosophy (1755), vol. I, in Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson 
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1969), vol. V, p. 253.
49) Ibid., p. 331.
50) Ibid., p. 322. 
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There are ‘strong feelings in our hearts’ that pertain to the acquisition of 
goods by labour. We feel ‘a sense of liberty within us, a strong desire of 
acting according to our own inclinations, and to gratify our own affections, 
whether selfish, or generous’; we have ‘a deep resentment of any 
obstruction given to these natural desires and endeavours’; and we feel 
that we disapprove of any such obstruction as ‘unkind and cruel, where no 
important publick interest requires it’.51) On the other hand, Hutcheson 
explains ‘the general interest’ in the following terms: the most effective 
way of exciting men to ‘constant patience and diligence in all sorts of 
useful industry’ is to give every one of them the right of property, and to 
secure ‘to everyone the fruits of his labour’. By this method, they can 
engage in labour, while entertaining ‘the hopes of future wealth, ease, and 
pleasure to themselves, their offspring, and all who are dear to them’.52) 
Thus A System of Moral Philosophy confirms that in justifying property 
rights, Hutcheson appeals to the sense of humanity as well as the general 
interest of all. He also clarifies what is involved in the ‘strong feelings in 
our hearts’ which are connected with the labour-based acquisition of 
goods.
Concluding Remarks
   On the whole, Hutcheson’s works clearly show that there are diverse 
strategies and arguments that one could develop within the framework of 
unilateralism. They may even make us feel uncertain whether they form a 
single coherent system. For the purpose of giving a narrative of post-
Lockean unilateralism, it is not necessary to show that Hutcheson or any 
other thinker really had a coherent system. All I want to claim is that there 
is a significant line of continuity from Locke onwards, while Barbeyrac, 
Carmichael, and Hutcheson developed various unilateralist strategies and 
arguments in explaining the origin and justification of property. As my 
narrative has shown, Barbeyrac and Carmichael adopted Locke’s main 
51) Ibid., pp. 319-320.
52) Ibid., p. 321.
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ideas and supplemented them with one or two ideas of their own, while 
Hutcheson mixed his functionalist and humanitarian views with Locke’s 
insights. At times, Hutcheson developed his own ideas and arguments in 
new directions. So we are entitled to say that Hutcheson modified Locke’s 
unilateralism while the other two virtually inherited it. But this should not 
be taken to mean that Hutcheson had only tenuous connections with 
Locke’s unilateralism. His account in the Inquiry, as we have seen, was 
inspired by the consequentialist part of Locke’s justification of unilateral 
appropriation, i.e. what Locke had said about the ‘value’-enhancing 
capacity of human labour. The accounts offered in the Short Introduction 
and A System of Moral Philosophy also appealed to the general interest of 
all, but they focused more sharply on the special relationship holding 
between a labourer and a laboured-on object, and a spectator’s reaction to 
a hypothetical interception of the object. As such, it was an attempt to 
clarify a set of ideas involved in Locke’s ‘joining’ and ‘mixing’ metaphor. 
Given these connections between Locke and Hutcheson, we can clearly see 
that Barbeyrac, Carmichael, and Hutcheson were united in defending the 
unilateral mode of appropriation, and rejecting the claim that legitimate 
appropriation requires the consent or approval of others. In short, they 
form a post-Lockean tradition of unilateralism. 
   To conclude this narrative, I should like to indicate what happened to 
this tradition at an early stage. It actually came be attacked by Hume in 
book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature (1st edition, 1740) and An Enquiry 
concerning the Principles of Morals (1st edition, 1751). Of course, there are 
many thinkers who have tried to revive unilateralism since Hume’s time. 
Robert Nozick53) is one of the recent examples. But the fact remains that 
Hume was one of the first philosophers who explicitly criticized Locke’s 
unilateralism and rejected Hutcheson’s version as well. Hume’s own 
account of the origin of property is a conventionalist one, so it is only 
natural that he rejected any version of unilateralism. Indeed, Hume’s is a 
53) See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Boston: Basic Books, 1974), chap. 7, 
sec. I. 
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far more refined version of conventionalism than Grotius’s, Hobbes’s, or 
Pufendorf’s.54) But what we should note here is that besides providing his 
conventionalist account in the Treatise 3.2.2, Hume launched specific 
criticisms against Locke’s unilateralism (THN 3.2.3.6 n. 72).55) In the 
Enquiry, Hume rejected Hutcheson’s version while incorporating part of 
his insights into his own system (EPM Appx. 3.10 n. 65).56) It goes beyond 
the scope of this paper to discuss Hume’s criticisms against Locke, or to 
explore his relationship to Hutcheson’s account. But Hume did try to put 
an end to the early modern tradition of unilateralism. This fact provides a 
clue as to where we should end the present narrative, as well as where we 
should begin. We have started with Locke, and traced the development of 
post-Lockean unilateralism through the works of Barbeyrac and 
Carmichael, and the early and later works of Hutcheson. Since this 
tradition came to an end with Hume’s attack, at least temporarily, it is 
appropriate that we close our narrative at this point.
54) A careful comparison is needed for Hume’s conventionalism and his 
predecessors’. For a comparison of Hume and Grotius, see my Japanese article 
entitled ‘Grotius no Shizenhogaku kara Hume no Rieki Hogaku e [From 
Grotius’s Natural Jurisprudence to Hume’s Interest Jurisprudence]’, in Shiso, 
no. 1052 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, December 2011), pp. 105-126.
55) David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [abbreviated as THN], A Critical 
Edition, vol. 1, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007).
56) David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals [abbreviated 
as EPM], A Critical Edition, edited by Tom L. Beachamp (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998).
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Abstract
   There are two distinct lines of thought which we can find in the early 
modern European discourse on the origin and justification of property. 
One is a conventionalist line represented by Grotius, Hobbes and 
Pufendorf. The other is a unilateralist one, which was hinted at by some 
Puritan colonists in America and came to be clearly formulated in the 
language of Locke. The former makes a mutual compact of human beings 
a necessary condition for the emergence and justification of property. The 
latter dispenses with the compact altogether, and claims that a unilateral 
acquisition of natural resources under certain favourable circumstances 
sufficiently explains and justifies property. It is Locke who proposed 
his unilateralist theory of appropriation as an alternative to the earlier 
conventionalism of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf.
   The purpose of this paper is to give a narrative of the development 
of post-Lockean unilateralism. It considers the works of Jean Barbeyrac, 
Gershom Carmichael, and Francis Hutcheson. It seeks to provide textual 
evidence to show that there is a significant line of continuity from Locke 
to Hutcheson, while it also involves the use of diverse strategies and 
arguments. Barbeyrac and Carmichael inherited Locke’s basic principles 
though they added one or two claims of their own. Hutcheson modified 
Locke’s unilateralism by combining his functionalist and humanitarian 
views with Locke’s insights. In the Inquiry Hutcheson seized upon the 
consequentialist part of Locke’s unilateralism, and recast it in terms of self-
love and motives to industry. In the Short Introduction, he appealed to the 
general interest of all, but he focused more sharply on the sense of humanity 
or the lack of it by discussing the case where one intercepts the product of 
another’s honest labour. And in A System of Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson 
linked human labour to ‘the immediate feelings of our hearts’ as well as 
‘the consideration of the general interest’. Despite the diverse views found 
in Hutcheson’s early and later works, it is possible to see that Barbeyrac, 
Carmichael, and Hutcheson are united in defending the unilateral mode of 
appropriation, and rejecting the claim of conventionalism.
